Monday, September 1, 2014

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA, Petitioners, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA, Petitioners,- versus -PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011

FIRST DIVISION D E C I S I O NDEL CASTILLO, J.:



Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws andregulations makes one automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree(P.D.) No. 705, as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

FACTS:Petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay CaptainSudaria of Tagpangi, CDO, Baillo and Boyatac, were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D.No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. City Prosecutor recommended to chargeVillarin as well.
The Version of the Defense:
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an,Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassableBatinay bridge. The project was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac toinquire from Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer.Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatacto attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was transported fromTagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Teamand taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty. RTCfound them guilty. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is punishable.
HELD:"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D.No. 705, to wit:(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest productsfrom any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or fromprivate land without any authorization; and(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documentsrequired under existing forest laws and regulations."The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which isconsummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper documents.As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent isnot an essential element. "However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had theintent to possess (animus possidendi)" the timber. "Possession, under the law, includes notonly actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the[object of the crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand,constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion andcontrol of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over theplace where it is found."There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timberwithout the requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in itsprocurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any competent
authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners’
contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for therepair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.



Monday, August 25, 2014

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: 
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.



ISSUE: 
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.




HELD: 
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources – somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Boracay et al vs DENR

NOTE: This case is consolidated with  G.R. No. 167707 (Secretary of DENR vs Yap).
Land Titles and Deeds – Land Classifications – Boracay Cases – Positive Act by the Government in Reclassifying Lands

These are two consolidated cases. In G.R. No. 167707, Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or  survey of land for titling purposes for the land they’ve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. This was on May 22, 2006
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD: The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926  ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.